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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Divisional Court’s judgment in R (on the application of Arthur) v Blackfriars Crown Court 
(hereafter ‘Arthur’) is of significance in relation to questions of both criminal procedure and the 
law of evidence. First, it raised the issue of the proper procedure to be followed for the judicial 
review of a refusal to state a case for the Crown Court. Second, it is notable as one of the very 
few reported cases following the Court of Appeal’s landmark judgment on good character 
evidence in Hunter,1 and as an example of the contentious case where adverse inferences are 
drawn from a defendant’s silence in police interview (pursuant to s.34 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994) despite the submission of a prepared written statement.  
II. THE FACTS IN ‘ARTHUR’ 
The facts can be stated briefly. The case concerned a persistent neighbour dispute between 
the claimant, Mr Arthur (A) and a Mr Williamson (W), which stemmed from the use of the 
shared balcony outside their respective flats. A was convicted at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ 
Court of an offence of common assault on W. On the day in question, A had taken some 
photos of a ladder outside W’s front door, which he believed encroached onto his window. An 
altercation followed when W challenged A about this conduct, which resulted in W sustaining 
a bloody nose after A punched him. W was restrained by his wife, but the report is then 
unclear exactly of what makeshift weapon W was in possession - a walking stick or metal 
pole, or even, perhaps, a standard lamp, as the report refers to a ‘standing lamp’. A was 
subsequently arrested and in his police interview exercised his right to silence but submitted a 
written statement, prepared with his solicitor, in which he denied assaulting W. A appealed 
unsuccessfully to the Crown Court and applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the 
Recorder’s decision to refuse to state a case in respect of four questions.  
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III. THE LEGAL ISSUES 
a) Refusal to state a case 
The first issue related to the procedure where a claimant applies to review judicially a court’s 
refusal to state a case. The claimant received a document, signed by the Recorder ‘On behalf 
of the Crown Court’ and entitled ‘Official Decision’, which provided the Recorder’s answers to 
four questions and amounted to a refusal to state a case. The claimant, relying on r.35.2(5) of 
the Criminal Procedure Rules, argued that this document had no status and that only the 
judgment transcript from the time of conviction should be considered by the Divisional Court. 
As the Director of Public Prosecutions, an interested party, was able to argue the matter on 
the basis of the judgment and without recourse to the Recorder’s more detailed reasoning, the 
issue did not arise for argument. Nevertheless, the Divisional Court addressed the matter 
when it considered the substantive issues in the appeal. 
 The Court found it was settled law that a Crown Court sitting in an appellate capacity 
must provide reasons for its decision2 and that permission for judicial review of a court’s 
refusal to state a case should normally be granted on the basis of a reasoned judgment.3  As 
the justices in the magistrates’ court are permitted to expand on or ‘amplify’ their reasons,4 the 
Divisional Court inferred that the same would apply to the Crown Court sitting in its appellate 
capacity. Goss J, who gave the lead judgment, suggested that it would be helpful if the 
Criminal Procedure Rule Committee might formulate further guidance on the procedure, but it 
may be a moot point whether the position should be different where it is the Crown Court and 
not a magistrates’ court that has declined to state a case. Arguably, one might expect the 
Crown Court judgment to have been fully reasoned in the first place and further amplification 
of it may raise a suspicion of the ex post facto rationalisation deprecated by the Divisional 
Court in both Marshall v CPS5 and R v Snaresbrook Crown Court.6  
 The claimant’s substantive appeal was on four grounds. One related to the Court’s 
omission to consider inconsistencies between the accounts of W and his wife. The Divisional 
Court held that the Court’s reasoning was sufficient and that it was unnecessary to address 
expressly each point made by the claimant. Two further grounds related to the claimant 
exercising his right to silence at the police station.  
b) The right to silence provisions 
The claimant’s argument that he had been convicted wholly or mainly on the basis of his 
silence was dismissed as contrary to the facts, given that the court had the benefit of seeing 
and hearing witnesses. However, it was further argued that no adverse inference, pursuant to 
s.34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,7 should have been drawn from his 
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omission to mention when interviewed that W tried to attack him with a ‘standing’ lamp. It was 
contended that it could not be argued that the lamp should have been raised by A in his police 
interview because there was no evidence before the Court, as the Crown had failed to adduce 
evidence of the questions that were asked in interview. However, the Divisional Court held this 
not to be material and focused on the fact that the defendant had maintained his silence 
except for submitting a prepared written statement, which made no reference to the lamp. 
This is the well-known strategy of handing in a written statement prepared by a solicitor and 
accused in order to meet the s.34 provision. The broad effect of s.34 is that a jury may draw 
adverse inferences if the accused relies on a fact at trial, which he could reasonably have been 
expected to mention in his interview or on charge. However, it is clear that adverse inferences 
may only be drawn from the failure to mention a fact and not simply from the failure to 
answer questions. Therefore, a fact mentioned in a prepared statement will amount to 
‘mentioning a fact’ for the purpose of avoiding an adverse inference at trial.8  
 On the one hand, the advantage for an accused of submitting a prepared statement in 
interview, for example, where the facts are complex and have not been fully disclosed by the 
police, is that he or she will not have to respond further to police questioning and the 
accompanied risk of self-incrimination. However, on the other hand, the danger of such a 
strategy is that adverse inferences are drawn at trial because when giving evidence the 
accused elaborates much more on matters from his or her interview9 or, as in Arthur, makes a 
significant omission from the prepared statement.10 Whether the additional facts given by the 
accused in evidence at trial are simply putting ‘flesh on the bones’11 of a prepared statement, 
rather than ‘embellishing’ it, as was found in Arthur,12 may be finely balanced. As the Divisional 
Court observed, that is the risk to which the accused exposes himself or herself if he or she 
relies on a prepared statement,13 but it is submitted that where it is a missing detail, such as 
the identity of an item used in an assault, as in Arthur, such inferences are not properly drawn. 
However, the ground of appeal in Arthur that is of most significance is that the court did not 
direct itself on or pay regard to the credibility aspect of the claimant’s good character. 
c) Good character directions 
The Recorder in Arthur directed the Court that the defendant’s good character “made it less 
likely that he would act in the way that has now been alleged against him”.14 That is, the 
defendant’s good character could be taken into account because it affected his propensity to 
offend. However, his direction omitted to mention that good character was also relevant to the 
defendant’s credibility as a witness.  
The form of a good character direction has been settled law for many years.15 The Court of 
Appeal in Vye16 laid down a basic structure for a mandatory good character direction that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
and (d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences from the 
failure as appear proper. 
8 Knight [2004] 1 Cr App R 9 [10]. 
9 Eg James [2018] EWCA Crim 285. 
10 Turner [2004] 1 All ER 1025; Parradine [2011] EWCA Crim 656. 
11 McGarry [1999] 1 WLR 1500. 
12 R (on the application of Arthur) v Blackfriars Crown Court [2018] 2 Cr App R 4 [21]. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid [13].  
15 For a full account of the law on good character, see Richard Glover, Murphy on Evidence (15th edn, Oxford University Press 
2017) ch 14. 
16 [1993] 1 WLR 471. 
58  Richard Glover 
 
consisted of the two ‘limbs’ of propensity and credibility. This was confirmed by the House of 
Lords in Aziz17 and remains the law.18 Prior to these judgments, the obligation to direct the 
court on an accused’s good character was unclear. At one time directions on good character 
appear to have been at the complete discretion of the trial judge. In Aberg19 it was argued that 
following Bliss Hill20 the omission of a good character direction was a misdirection and good 
grounds for appeal. However, Lord Goddard CJ held that so long as the summing-up was 
otherwise fair, an omission to direct on good character was no reason to quash a conviction.21 
His Lordship distinguished Bliss Hill on the basis that it was concerned with a faulty good 
character direction rather than no direction, and held that defendants had no prima facie 
entitlement to a good character direction at common law, although one could be provided at 
the judge’s discretion.  
 Arguably, the more recent case of Hunter22 has returned the law to a positon where 
good character directions are again a matter for the trial judge’s discretion rather than law. 
However, before we consider this, we should first address briefly what is meant by ‘good 
character’ in a criminal trial. Its meaning, perhaps surprisingly for a term that is often central 
to criminal trials, is somewhat contentious. In Rowton23 a thirteen-strong Court of Crown 
Cases Reserved held that character witnesses were permitted to testify as to the accused’s 
“general reputation in the neighbourhood in which he lives” in order to show “the tendency and 
disposition of the man’s mind towards committing or abstaining from committing the class of 
crime with which he stands charged”.24 Importantly, evidence of specific good acts and 
individuals’ opinions were held to be inadmissible, although the absence of previous 
convictions or other indications of bad character were admissible. It is commonly stated that 
the rule is “more honoured in the breach than in the observance”25 and in Hunter the Court of 
Appeal inferred that Rowton could be departed from, but it is evident that it remains good law 
in England and Wales26 and other jurisdictions.27   
 The Court of Appeal in Hunter asserted that the circumstances in which good 
character directions were given had ‘been extended too far’ to include unmeritorious 
defendants,28 but acknowledged that it was, nevertheless, bound by the House of Lords 
decision in Aziz.29 However, with respect, the Court appeared to misinterpret the judgment in 
Aziz, in which Lord Steyn outlined a mandatory rule that “prima facie the directions must be 
given” where a person is of good character.30 In Aziz, ‘good character’ was broadly understood 
to mean that the defendant’s ‘general reputation’ was good, encompassing no previous 
convictions (or none that were relevant) and no other relevant ‘bad character’. In contrast, the 
Court of Appeal adopted a much narrower definition of ‘good character’, so that an accused 
                                                            
17 [1996] AC 41 (HL). 
18 Hunter (n 1) [78]. 
19 [1948] 2 KB 173. 
20 Broadhurst; Bliss Hill (1918) 13 Cr App R 125. This case was concerned with a firm of solicitors located at 19 Queen Square, 
Wolverhampton. 
21 Smith [1971] Crim LR 531. 
22 Hunter (n 1). 
23 (1865) Le & Ca 520. 
24 Ibid 529-530. 
25 D Ormerod & D Perry (eds) Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2019 (Oxford University Press 2018) para F14.30. 
26 Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4; Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr App R 10 and Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600. 
27 Eg Northern Ireland: Grimes [2017] NICA 19; Australia: Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353; Canada: McMillan [1977] 2 SCR 824; 
Dees [1978] 40 CCC (2d) 58; in Ireland, The People (at the suit of the DPP), Prosecutor v Ferris [2008] IR 1, and in Hong Kong, 
HKSAR v Poon Ching Ki [2009] 3 HKC 149.   
28 Hunter (n 1) [20] and [70]. 
29 Aziz (n 17). 
30 Aziz (n 17) 53E. 
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with any previous convictions, however minor or old, could not be regarded as being of good 
character. Thus, Hallett LJ stated such a defendant is not of good character ‘in the proper 
sense’.31  
 After Hunter, it may be that a judge will direct that the defendant can be treated as 
being of ‘effective good character’, provided any bad character is ‘old, minor and irrelevant’. 
However, as Hallett LJ insisted these words must be read conjunctively,32 the circumstances 
in which an accused will qualify as being of either ‘absolute’ or ‘effective’ good character 
appear to be very limited. Further, as the matter is entirely at the judge’s discretion, the Court 
of Appeal emphasised that it would be ‘very slow’ to interfere with the exercise of that 
discretion.33  The shift from a mandatory to what is now, in essence, a discretionary rule has 
had the effect of far fewer appeals being brought on the grounds of a judge’s omission to 
provide good character directions.   
 This is borne out by the way the Divisional Court dealt with the appeal in Arthur. The 
Recorder’s omission to direct clearly on the credibility limb of good character was dismissed 
as unimportant because, although not mentioned expressly, it was considered the Court 
would have had it in mind. The Divisional Court was able to pray in aid the Court of Appeal’s 
assertion that, unlike in the past, a misdirection on good character “will not usually be fatal”34 
to the safety of a conviction. However, this overlooks an important fair trial reason for the 
provision of clear and complete directions on good character.  
 The European Court of Human Rights has held that art. 6(1) of the European 
Convention obliges courts to give reasons for their judgments in both civil and criminal 
proceedings as a safeguard against arbitrariness.35 However, as juries do not provide reasons 
for their verdicts, the Grand Chamber has held that it, nevertheless, remains important that 
both the defendant and the public should be able to understand the reasons for a conviction. 
In lieu of a reasoned verdict the Grand Chamber indicated in Taxquet v Belgium that 
appropriate safeguards would be: 
…directions or guidance by the presiding judge to the jurors on the legal 
issues arising or the evidence adduced… forming a framework on which the 
verdict is based or sufficiently offsetting the fact that no reasons are given 
for the jury’s answers.36 
Following Taxquet it has been argued that for jury trials to remain fair and for verdicts to 
maintain their legitimacy, judicial directions must be ‘relatively full’.37 Accordingly, where 
relevant, it is necessary that good character directions should be included in a properly 
structured summing up’38 as part of this overall ‘framework of fairness.’39  
As we have seen, the Crown Court sitting in its appellate capacity is already obliged under 
common law to provide reasons for its judgment. However, it is submitted that it is also 
important that it should direct itself properly on good character, so that it is clear to both the 
defendant and the public that both limbs of the direction –propensity and credibility - have 
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been addressed in its deliberations. It is regrettable that the court in Arthur omitted to do so 
and, moreover, it is contended that this was inconsistent with the mandatory nature of the 
good character direction provided for by the House of Lords in Aziz.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In view of the absence of appeals on good character evidence since Hunter, the result of the 
appeal in Arthur was not unexpected. However, it does serve to underline that the 
consequences of Hunter are that good character directions will be given less often and 
omissions to direct a jury (or the court) will not usually be fatal to the safety of the conviction. 
Nor was it surprising that the court found little problem with the Crown Court’s treatment of 
the s.34 issues. However, there was a clear contrast between the Divisional Court’s relaxed 
treatment of the Recorder’s omission to direct properly on good character and his more 
exacting approach to the accused’s failure to mention some detail in his defence at the police 
station that he later relied on at trial. It is submitted that the reverse should apply. That is, 
there should be a return to the mandatory good character direction, required by the House of 
Lords in Aziz.  
 In addition, further leeway should be given to accused, such as Arthur, who elaborate 
at trial on their account at the police station in a way that may be properly characterised as 
putting ‘flesh on the bones’ of their defence rather than merely ‘embellishing’ it. The line 
between the two may often be a fine one to draw, but it is contended that the accused should 
normally be given the benefit of any doubt.  
 
